Refinancing a first mortgage puts legal principles in conflict when other, junior, liens also exist. On one hand, the principle that seniority follows time priority leaves the new refinancing mortgage junior to mortgages that were junior to the original, refinanced first mortgage. On the other hand, the principle of equitable subrogation gives the refinancing mortgage the seniority of the claim it paid down. States resolve this tension differently, thus differentiating how much a second mortgage impedes refinancing of the first. We exploit this cross-state variation to identify the impact on mortgage refinancing and find that refinancing is significantly more likely in the states following the principle of equitable subrogation when the homeowner also has a second mortgage.
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Introduction
Residences in the U.S. often have multiple mortgages. As of March 2012, 23.5% of homes with a mortgage had more than one; as of December 2008 it was 30%. 1 In these cases, the mortgages' relative seniority generally follows a simple rule: Seniority follows the mortgages' time order. The mortgage taken out first is the most senior, followed by the next mortgage taken out, and so on. This principle, which we label time priority, is convenient and easy to follow, but it has a potentially perverse effect on refinancing a first mortgage, because a replacement for the first of multiple mortgages is newer than, and thus by this principle junior to, mortgages that the original first mortgage was senior to. The originally junior mortgagees can waive this windfall of seniority with subordination agreements, i.e., documents affirming their subordination to the replacement mortgage, but they don't have to. Thus, in a refinancing situation, a second mortgagee can wield blocking power over the mortgagor. This paper addresses the effect of this blocking power.
We can identify the effect of the blocking power through its variation across states. This is because a subset of states follows a legal principle known as equitable subrogation that targets and largely eliminates the perverse effect. Subrogation is the inheritance by a new creditor of the seniority of the creditor it paid off; equitable subrogation provides that this inheritance occurs when the new mortgage does not disadvantage junior mortgagees, relative to the old mortgage.
So if the new mortgage has principal and interest no higher, and maturity no shorter, than the mortgage it extinguished, then it enjoys the old mortgage's seniority, despite the violation of time priority. If the new mortgage, relative to the old, impairs the junior mortgagee on one of these dimensions, then it enjoys seniority to an extent equivalent to that of the old. By eliminating the second mortgage's role in refinancings that do not disadvantage it, equitable 1 Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel.
subrogation removes its blocking power, which means we can observe the effect of this power in the contrast in refinancings between those in states that have adopted this principle and those in states adhering to strict time priority. 2 Whether a refinancing is exposed to this blocking power depends not only on local state law but also on the mortgagor's remaining home equity, reflected in the home's combined loanto-value ratio (CLTV) . If the CLTV is low enough, then the mortgagor can refinance all mortgages at once, thereby avoiding bargaining by extinguishing all bargainers' claims. If the CLTV is high enough, then refinancing any mortgage is unlikely. It is in the middle region where refinancing the first of multiple mortgages arises and, therefore, where the second's bargaining power matters. Consequently, the identification is a triple difference: the difference across states of the difference between medium-CLTV refinancings and low-or high-CLTV refinancings of mortgages that are or are not senior to second mortgages.
To run this identification, we assemble a database of recent mortgages, starting with 3.9 million mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007 from the LPS Mortgage Dataset. We associate them with junior liens by matching them to credit bureau data, and we keep our CLTV estimates current by updating house prices with zip-code-level indices. Our database of state laws is current as of September 2008, so we focus on refinancing in 2009. This was a period of significant financial distress, which introduces other issues into refinancing, so to focus on the effect of the legal environment, we limit our sample to mortgagors who were current on all mortgages as of December 2008. In addition, as can be seen from Figure 1 , mortgage rates dropped dramatically at the end of 2008, which spurred a wave of refinancing.
3
Our principal finding is that refinancing is significantly affected by the legal environment. In the states without equitable subrogation, the probability of refinancing is much lower, relative to the other states, when the CLTV is in the medium range between 75% and 95%. There is little or no effect when CLTV is higher or lower, and the difference between the medium-CLTV case and the others is statistically significant. A probit specification finds the probability of refinancing to be 1.3 percentage points higher in the refinancing-friendly environment, relative to the sample average 2009 refinancing probability for homeowners in the middle-CLTV region of 12%.
The rest of this paper is in four sections. In Section 2 we survey the related legal and economic literature, in Section 3 we describe the data, in Section 4 we describe the empirical testing strategy and discuss its results, and in Section 5 we summarize and conclude.
Background and Literature
Junior mortgages figure heavily in both pre-crisis borrowing and in subsequent distress.
There is an accordingly large and growing literature on the role of junior mortgagees in the resolution of distress. The focus of this literature is not on refinancings that potentially alter seniority, but rather on modifications that preserve seniority while forgiving principal. The main concern this literature addresses is the weak incentive of junior mortgagees to forgive and the resulting difficulty reducing prohibitive indebtedness. Relevant studies include Agarwal et al. (2011 ), Cordell et al (2008 , Goodman (2011), and Mayer et al. (2009) .
The principle of time priority that we focus on is summarized in this passage from Schmudde (2004) : "The first mortgage on a property, being the first recorded, has first priority. All later recorded mortgages applying to a single property are called "junior" mortgages. The basic rule of mortgage priority is that it is set by the time of recording. Earlier recording grants earlier priority. This can only be changed when a mortgagee who has earlier recorded agrees to subordinate her interest." 4 The problem arising from this principle is that it ties a potentially deal-breaking wealth transfer to a run-of-the-mill refinancing. If a borrower refinances the senior of two mortgages, the replacement mortgage is newer than the old junior mortgage, making the old junior mortgage now the senior one. So this principle hands the old junior mortgage a large transfer from the entering mortgage without regard to whether the entering mortgage would make the old junior mortgage better off, even without this transfer, which it presumably would if it simply lowered the first mortgage's coupon.
Countervailing the time-priority doctrine is the doctrine of equitable subrogation, also known as legal subrogation. This principle is articulated in §7.6(a) of American Law Institute (1997):
One who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Even though the performance would otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage, they are preserved and the mortgage retains its priority in the hands of the subrogee.
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By this principle, which is explicated in depth in Nelson and Whitman (2006 ), Yoo (2011 ), and Been, Howell and Willis (2012 , the refinancing mortgage inherits the refinanced mortgage's seniority, with or without subordination agreements from any intervening liens, provided the replacement of the old mortgage with the new does not disadvantage the lienholders. Jurisdictions around the country have adopted three different approaches in determining whether to apply equitable subrogation under circumstances in which a third party holds a lien on the property at the time the second lender pays off the former encumbrance. The first approach reasons that actual knowledge of an existing lien precludes the application of equitable subrogation, but constructive knowledge does not. See, e.g., Osterman v. Baber, 714 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) . The second approach bars the application of equitable subrogation when the party seeking subrogation possesses either actual or constructive notice of an existing lien. See, e.g., Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329, 332 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002) .
The third approach, adopted by the Restatement, disregards actual or constructive notice and concentrates on whether the junior lienholder will be prejudiced by subrogation. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.6 (1997) . Under the Restatement, a mortgagee will be subrogated when it pays the entire loan of another as long as the mortgagee "was promised repayment and reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage being discharged, and if subrogation will not materially prejudice the holders of intervening interests in the real estate." Id.
Minnesota has adopted the second approach (actual or constructive notice of an existing lien bars equitable subrogation) with the added criterion that when a sophisticated party -such as a professional lender -is seeking subrogation, it will be held to a higher standard for the purpose of determining whether it has acted under a justifiable or excusable mistake of fact in failing to duly investigate prior liens. 6 In the language of the court, actual notice of a lien means a lender actually knew of it, whereas constructive notice means the lien was properly and promptly registered, so the lender could have known about it. So in Minnesota, a refinancing lender does not inherit the seniority of the refinanced mortgage with respect to an intervening mortgage he knew or could have known about, unless the holder of the intervening lien agrees. The geographic distribution of these states is presented as Figure 2 , which shows them to be widely dispersed across the country.
The empirical question we address is whether the blocking power imparted to the second lienholders by the absence of equitable subrogation reduces the incidence of refinancing. It is worth noting that this reduction could occur several ways. It could result from frictions when second lienholders with limited information bargain for rents. For example, a lender unable to distinguish between the various borrowers asking for subordination might make them all the same take-it-or-leave-it offer, which some would leave. Similarly, lenders or borrowers with some information might yet overplay their hands. Alternatively, failure could result from borrowers struggling to contact or even identify their current lenders or from lenders being willing but unable to subordinate due to contractual restrictions or complications, perhaps arising from securitization agreements. A servicer might also simply have too much paperwork or other time-consuming labor to pay it the proper attention. So it is some combination of these and related hazards peculiar to states without equitable subrogation that we hypothesize to reduce the incidence of refinancing. 7 We include the District of Columbia as an easy subrogation state, but our results are robust to this coding.
Data Description
The dataset based on loan characteristics at origination. The matching procedure is described in more detail in Elul et al. (2010) . The importance of this matching for evaluating the effect of equitable subrogation laws is that it provides information on other (second) mortgages held by the same borrower because these mortgages appear in bureau records.
From the LPS data, we obtain first-mortgage characteristics such as origination FICO score, interest rate, LTV ratio, etc. We also update the LTV using the most current balance on the mortgage and the Corelogic zip code level house price index. From the consumer credit bureau data, we obtain the borrower's updated Equifax risk score and information about second mortgage balances.
For those mortgages that terminate (55% of the sample), we use the bureau data to determine whether this termination took place through a refinancing.
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A terminated mortgage is identified as a refinancing if the borrower did not move in a one-year window spanning the mortgage termination date (based on the address in credit bureau records) and a new mortgage account appears in the bureau data with an opening date that is within three months of the mortgage termination date.
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For our final sample, approximately one-half of all terminations are identified as refinancings, which is consistent with the findings of Clapp et al. (2001) .
We restrict the sample to those residences that had active and nondelinquent first mortgages as of December 2008 (and if a second mortgage exists, it must also be current). In order to create a more uniform dataset, we also restrict attention to prime, owner-occupied conventional first mortgages, with balances greater than $100,000, and to "primary" Equifax panel members (for whom data are available in every quarter).
10 Table 2 summarizes the matched database along a number of dimensions. It also provides the same statistics for a random sample of mortgages from the LPS data that were not matched to the FRBNY/Equifax data, to help gauge whether the matching procedure biases the sample in any way.
The comparison between mortgage refinancings in easy and not-easy states drives the identification in the empirical tests. To document how the mortgages themselves compare, Table   3 separates the matched sample into easy vs. not-asy states and reports the mortgage characteristics in each. 9 The new mortgage must further have a balance that is at least 90% that of the old mortgage just before termination; we also allow the refinancing mortgage to be a second mortgage in case the legal environment affects how the bureaus code the mortgages. We tested this algorithm out-of-sample on mortgage originations in LPS (for which there is a refinancing flag) and found that it identifies approximately 80% of all refinancings at origination. Conversely, we correctly identify about 75% of all purchase loans at origination. 10 See Lee and van der Klaauw (2010) for further detail on the FRBNY/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel.
An Illustrative Model of Refinancing
We now present a simple model to illustrate how the effect of subrogation law varies across CLTV regions. Assume that a homeowner has a first and second mortgage, with balances F 1 and F 2 and gross interest rates R 1 and R 2 , respectively, and that they mature on the same future date. So mortgage i can be paid down for F i today or F i R i at maturity. Assume also that the home's market value is currently V 0 and that its value at maturity will be V = V 0 + ε, where ε follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ, and furthermore that the homeowner's valuation is and will be identical to the market valuation. Assume finally that if a mortgage goes into foreclosure, any current lender suffers a cost c in addition to any losses from recoveries falling short of the balance owed. This cost represents both labor and legal costs and any regulatory attention attracted by the loan's failure.
Suppose a new lender enters this economy, one willing to lend to refinance one or both mortgages, provided he at least breaks even in expectation. As we show in the appendix, the effect of the subrogation regime on this potential refinancing is in one parameter region, the region where the lender would earn an expected profit from refinancing the first mortgage at its current rate R 1 , but an expected loss from refinancing both mortgages at their collective current rate (F 1 R 1 +F 2 R 2 )/(F 1 +F 2 ). In this region, the only gains from trade are from refinancing just the first mortgage, with the second mortgagee's cooperation. Figure 3 illustrates the solution to this model for a particular parameter vector, (F 1 , R 1 , R 2 , V 0 , σ, c) = (80, 1.10, 1.12, 150, 50, 10), with F 2 ranging from 10 to 100 to capture the effect of rising CLTV. When CLTV is low, we see that refinancing either the first mortgage or both at current rates is profitable, so the first mortgage will be refinanced, one way or another. When CLTV is in the middle, refinancing only the first mortgage is profitable, so this is the region where the second's cooperation, if the law requires it, adds value. When CLTV is high, neither refinancing is profitable, so the first mortgage will not be refinanced, with or without cooperation. The figure illustrates the dynamics defining the middle range: The line representing the first mortgage hits zero at a higher CLTV than does the line representing both, since the former bends down due to the rising expected foreclosure cost, whereas the latter bends down due to both the rising expected foreclosure cost and the falling expected recovery, and thus hits zero sooner.
The model is too stylized to identify the bounds for our tests, but it does provide some intuition: The lower bound reflects the recovery and foreclosure risks of the combined mortgages, and the upper bound reflects just the foreclosure risk, given the prevailing uncertainty over future house prices. Uncertainty was high in our sample period, so we set the lower bound a little below the standard 80% cutoff, at 75%, and the upper bound close to zero home equity at 95%.
Empirical Tests
The test design is a probit model where each observation is a homeowner with a first mortgage and the dependent variable indicates whether the homeowner's first mortgage was refinanced in 2009.
indicating whether homeowner i lives in state j, and let D i denote the vector of all these dummy variables for i. Second i is equal to 1 if the homeowner also has a second mortgage. Recall that the homeowner's combined CLTV can be in the low, medium, or high region. Let CLTV M,i be a dummy variable indicating whether homeowner i falls in the medium CLTV region, and let CLTV H,i indicate whether he is in the high CLTV region.
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Finally, X i is a vector of other characteristics (for example, credit score, interest rate, etc., as described below).
Then under the probit model, the probability of homeowner i refinancing is:
Since the law governing subrogation in the case of refinancing is state law, the coefficients are not identified in general. The key identifying restrictions we make are that 
The independent variables include standard mortgage and borrower characteristics from the LPS dataset (e.g., initial LTV and FICO score) observed at origination. We also estimate the CLTV as of December 2008, dividing the sum of first and second mortgage balances (from the LPS and bureau data, respectively) by an estimate of the current house price. The latter is obtained by updating the house value at origination with the change in the ZIP-code level house price index since origination. And the homeowner's second mortgage balance is from the bureau data.
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We control for several other likely influences on refinancing, all dated December 2008:
the county-level unemployment rate (from the BLS), the current mortgage interest rate (from LPS), and the updated Equifax risk score (from the bureau data), as well as whether the borrower has a second mortgage. In order to capture the wide variety of cross-state differences, we also include state fixed effects.
14 Since we also include a dummy variable for "easy" refinancing states, we omit one state fixed effect.
To operationalize the prediction that the blocking power is strongest in the medium range of CLTV, we sort observations by CLTV into low, medium, and high buckets.
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The medium range is a CLTV ratio from 75% to 95%; the low range is below that, and the high range is above.
To motivate our analysis, we begin by presenting the incidence of refinancing in 2009 in Table 4 , sorted by the presence of a second mortgage and by CLTV range. This table gives a sense of the relevant three-way interaction, i.e., whether residing in an easy state makes refinancing more likely when there is a second mortgage and the CLTV ratio is in the middle range.
The table shows an interaction in the predicted direction. In the low and high CLTV ranges, there is little marginal impact from being in an easy state on the effect of a second mortgage on the likelihood of refinancing. That is, in the low range, the presence of a second mortgage associates with a 0.6 percentage point higher probability of refinancing in the not-easy states (17.4% with a second mortgage, versus 16.8% without), and 0.9 percentage point higher in 13 This may be from either closed-end home equity installment loans or revolving home equity lines of credit. 14 The results were not materially affected by omitting these. 15 See also Elul et al. (2010) , where CLTV buckets are used in a model of mortgage default and interacted with other borrower characteristics.
the easy states (16.2% versus 15.3%). In the high CLTV range, it associates with a 0.9 percentage point decrease in the refinancing probability in not-easy states and a 0.4 percentage point decrease in the easy states. By contrast, in the middle CLTV range, the effect of being in an easy state on the effect of a second mortgage on refinancing is strongly positive (13.6% versus 11.5%), whereas in the not-easy states it is actually slightly negative.
For a formal hypothesis test, we now estimate the probit model described above. The results are in Table 5 .
Before getting to the key test statistics, it is worth noting that the variables capturing the benefit of refinancing to the homeowner have the expected signs.
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Loans with higher interest rates are more likely to be refinanced, as are mortgages with larger balances. Fixed-rate loans, as well as ARMS with long fixed periods, are more likely to be refinanced than ARMS with short fixed-rate periods. Other explanatory variables also enter as expected: Loans with high risk scores (either the FICO score at origination or the Equifax risk score as updated in December 2008,) are more likely to be refinanced, and subprime loans are less likely to be refinanced, as are higher-LTV loans.
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Loans with balances above the conforming loan limit as of December 2008 (i.e., $417,000) are less likely to be refinanced, reflecting the tighter underwriting conditions since the financial crisis began.
We now turn to the variables at the center of our analysis: the presence of a second mortgage, the state legal environment, and the CLTV ratio. Being in a higher CLTV range is associated with a lower refinancing probability (relative to the omitted category of CLTV<75%.)
Borrowers with second mortgages are more likely to refinance, most likely so that they can roll 16 See Elul (2012) for further discussion of the determinants of refinancing and how they have changed over time. 17 In addition, 40-year mortgages are less likely to be refinanced, as these loans were typically taken out by riskier, liquidity-constrained borrowers. By contrast, 30-year mortgages are more likely to refinance (relative to the omitted category, 15-year) reflecting the borrower benefit.
both mortgages into a single, new loan. The coefficient on easy subrogation laws is negative, but it cannot be interpreted independently of the state fixed effects.
Finally, consider the interaction terms that are at the heart of our analysis. First, the twoway interaction between the second mortgage indicator and easy subrogation laws is insignificant. Since we also include a three-way interaction with the middle and high CLTV regions, as discussed below, this two-way interaction actually captures the effect of subrogation law on borrowers with second mortgages in the low CLTV region. The fact that it is insignificant is consistent with our model, which only predicts a significant effect for the middle CLTV region. The three-way interactions between the CLTV category, the second mortgage indicator, and easy subrogation laws are also consistent with our earlier predictions. The interaction with the middle CLTV region is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction with the high CLTV region is insignificant.
To help interpret these results, in Panel B of this table we compute the marginal effect of a second mortgage on the probability of refinancing. It is only in the middle CLTV region that there is a significant difference in the impact of a having a second mortgage between the easy and not-easy states: In the easy subrogation states, borrowers with second mortgages are 2.9
percentage points more likely to refinance in 2009, whereas in the not-easy states the marginal effect of a second mortgage is only 1.6 percentage points. This constitutes a significant increase in the probability of refinancing, as compared with the average refinancing probability for 2009 of 12%.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper addresses the conflicting legal principles at stake when a homeowner wishes to refinance the senior of multiple mortgages. It does so by relating the incidence of refinancing to both the cross section of state legal environments and mortgage circumstances. The key finding is that those states that resolve the conflict by allowing the second mortgage to block the refinancing show significantly less such refinancing. This is a potentially significant barrier to refinancing whose economic significance is heighted by today's historically low rates. 
Appendix: Illustrative Model
Because the borrower's valuation is identical to the market valuation, the borrower will repay his mortgage or mortgages in full on the maturity date if the market value V is greater than the balance due, and will otherwise give up the house to foreclosure. So absent any refinancing, there are three cases:
 If V > F 1 R 1 +F 2 R 2 , the first and second mortgagees are paid in full.
 If F 1 R 1 < V < F 1 R 1 +F 2 R 2 , the first mortgagee is paid in full, the second mortgagee suffers a recovery loss, and both mortgagees pay the foreclosure cost c.
 If V < F 1 R 1 , the first mortgagee suffers a recovery loss, the second mortgagee is wiped out, and both mortgagees pay the foreclosure cost c.
Given the assumption that V = V 0 + ε, where ε is N(0,σ), the first mortgagee's expected repayment, net of foreclosure costs, which we denote E 1 , is
Φ
Since the new lender needs only to break even in expectation, it follows that if E 1 >F 1 , there exists an R<R 1 such that the lender would refinance the first mortgage at rate R, and this would make the borrower better off, since his repayment at maturity would be lower. It would also make the second mortgagee better off, since the balance senior to him would be lower, and the probability of foreclosure would be lower.
We can similarly determine whether the new lender would refinance both mortgages. Let R B = (F 1 R 1 +F 2 R 2 )/(F 1 +F 2 ), i.e., the interest rate on both mortgages put together. If the new 32 lender refinanced both mortgages at this rate, the borrower's repayment at maturity would be unchanged, and the new lender's expected repayment, which we denote E B , would be
If E B > F 1 +F 2 , then there exists an R<R B such that the lender would refinance both mortgages at R, and the borrower would be better off.
Therefore, the parameter region where the first mortgage is refinanced if and only if the second mortgage cooperates is where E 1 >F 1 and E B < F 1 +F 2 . To illustrate this parameter region, Figure 2 plots E 1 /F 1 -1 ("first," the blue line) and E B /(F 1 +F 2 )-1 ("both," the red line) for the parameter vector indicated in the text.
